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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, REPLY BRIEF 
-vs- Lower Court Civil No. 920902292 
Case No. 93 0121 CA 
TONY DONNELLY, Priority Classification 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant") 
and submits the following as his Reply Brief in the above-captioned 
case: 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The plaintiff's brief misrepresents the nature of the 
court orders appealed from. 
2. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof by failing 
to establish through clear and convincing evidence that defendant 
was in contempt of court. 
3. The court's order was too ambiguous to be enforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFF MISREPRESENTS THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL 
COURT-
Plaintiff makes much in his Brief of Appellee of the issue of 
defendant's physical distance from plaintiff on May 25, 1992, and 
June 21 and 22, 1992. To the extent that plaintiff is attempting 
to represent that defendant's physical proximity to plaintiff was 
at all relevant, this is a mischaracterization of the lower court's 
orders. 
The trial court did enjoin defendant from being within 200 
feet of the "premises where the Plaintiff may reside or be 
employed.11 It also enjoined defendant from being "within 50 feet 
of the Plaintiff . . . " However, all these restrictions were 
contained within the April 23, 1992, Temporary Restraining Order. 
That order expired, by its own terms, ten days later, on May 3, 
1992. Thereafter, by its own language, that order became void. 
Plaintiff reports that the trial court admonished defendant 
at the hearing on May 1, 1992, to keep a certain distance from the 
plaintiff. This assertion is not supported by the record. The 
court specifically declined to restrict defendant to keep a set 
distance from plaintiff, while defendant was at or in his own home. 
The court specifically stated, at the hearing when defendant was 
found in contempt: 
And the request was made that I limit Mr. 
Donnelly so that he could not be within 50 
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feet of Mr. Hansen when he came to pick up 
his child. And the request was made, Judge, 
if you do that, it's going to require that he 
go out and stand in the back corner of his 
lot somewhere if you impose that kind of 
restriction. And so the Court decided not to 
impose that restriction, but just order that 
he act reasonably. (R. 211, 11.23-212, 1.5) 
(emphasis added) 
Most importantly, plaintiff's characterization of the oral 
ruling is in direct contradiction to the language of the lower 
court's order entered June 5, 1992. The language of that order 
(which is the order defendant allegedly violated in May and June, 
1992) says absolutely nothing about defendant keeping a set 
distance from plaintiff or his property. This order was drafted by 
plaintiff's own counsel. Certainly, if the court had really 
ordered defendant to keep a set distance away from plaintiff, 
plaintiff's own counsel would have reflected that in the written 
order he prepared. 
Thus, plaintiff's assertion in his Brief of Appellee that 
defendant violated the June 5, 1992 order, solely by standing 
eighteen inches to two feet from defendant, is not valid. After 
the first restraining order expired on May 3, 1992, it simply did 
not matter how close defendant stood to plaintiff. 
Everything else plaintiff complained of at trial was of a 
highly subjective nature. For example, plaintiff complained in his 
testimony (and in his brief) that defendant "glared" or "stared" at 
plaintiff, or threatened plaintiff by "body language." Given 
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plaintiffs clear hostility toward defendant, his interpretation 
that defendant "glared" rather than just "looked" at plaintiff, or 
that his "body language" was "threatening," is not credible. His 
testimony on this point is not adequate to sustain plaintiff's 
burden of proof to support his claim of contempt by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER WAS AMBIGUOUS. 
Plaintiff does not address in his Brief of Appellee the issue 
of the ambiguity of the June 5, 1992 order. The order to "act 
reasonably" was too ambiguous to be enforceable in a contempt 
action. 
Plaintiff's brief supports defendant's claim that the order 
to "act reasonably" is too subjective to be enforceable. Plaintiff 
quotes the judge's own comment made at trial when the judge found 
defendant in contempt. The court stated: 
I'm going to find that the defendant is in contempt 
of this Court's orders now, and admittedly, Paragraph 2, 
plaintiff and defendant are ordered to act reasonably in 
the presence of each other. That may be a subjective 
determination. (R. 214) (emphasis added) 
The court goes on to decline to order a jail sentence for 
defendant, based upon lack of notice given by the earlier court 
order. 
As pointed out in plaintiff's own brief, the court felt the 
order was open to subjective interpretation. The court itself 
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found the notice to defendant, of what was required of him, to be 
so inadequate that a jail sentence could not be justified. 
For the very reason a jail term was improper, a finding of 
contempt was also improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court could not find, as a matter of law, that 
defendant had knowledge of the specific duty imposed upon him by 
the trial court, or the ability to comply with the order. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court could not find 
defendant in contempt. 
Since the court below could not find defendant to be in 
contempt, the court could not fine defendant $100.00 for contempt, 
nor assess defendant $1,000.00, for plaintiff's attorney's fee, as 
an additional sanction for contempt. 
The case should be remanded for reversal of the order of 
contempt, and of the order for sanctions, including the fine and 
attorney's fees. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1993 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant/appellant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be served upon 
plaintiff/respondent by placing two true and correct copies of the 
same in an envelope addressed to: 
THOMAS BLONQUIST 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
day of , 1993. 
Secretary 
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